2 edition of Use of legislative history in statutory interpretation found in the catalog.
Use of legislative history in statutory interpretation
Robert John Araujo
|Other titles||Look at Regents v. Bakke, Recurring question - clarification or confusion?|
|Statement||Robert John Araujo.|
|Series||Seton Hall legislative journal -- v. 16:no. 1-2|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||57-176, 551-683 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||683|
Legislative materials fail the presentment and bicameralism test. Violates separation of powers because courts step into legislative role when they give weight to legislative history materials. Judges are terrible historians and legislative scholars. Limiting interpretation to statutory text gives judges a much-needed discipline. "The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation: A Look at Administrative Tribunal Regents v. Bakke " 16 Seton Hall Legis J 57, , 3. Id. at 4. Fritz Snyder, "Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit" 49 Okla L Rev , , 5. Claire M. Germain, "Approaches to.
Censoring Legislative History: Justice Scalia on the Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation Elizabeth A. Liess University of Nebraska College of Law Follow this and additional works at: This book is designed to teach statutory interpretation skills. It uses a combination of traditional cases along with problems to accomplish that objective. Broadly organized around the process of interpretation, it focuses first on the plain meaning of the text and then addresses the question of whether and, if so, when courts will examine.
With regard to statutory interpretation, a new way of organizing text- based arguments beyond plain-meaning interpretation precedes intent-based approaches to interpretation, in turn followed by canon-based arguments demonstrating the weaknesses inherent in their use. Legislative Law and Statutory Interpretation then covers five broad areas Price: $ of legislative history in statutory interpretation. In particular, the Comment will focus on differing viewpoints within the present Supreme Court, including Justice Scalia, an outspoken critic of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Finally, the Comment will discuss the current controversy.
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Using Legislative History in American Statutory Interpretation examines the United States Supreme Court's actual use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, distills the theoretical issues presented by the Court's practices, then analyzes those issues in light of the arguments of several leading by: 1.
Using Legislative History in American Statutory Interpretation examines the United States Supreme Court's actual use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, distills the theoretical issues presented by the Court's practices, then analyzes those issues in light of the arguments of several leading theorists.
The book separates the utility and usability of legislative history from. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. REV. recent years suggest, certain aspects of statutory interpretation are still troubling.4 In my view, one primary problem stands out.
Several sub-stantive principles of interpretation — such as constitutional avoid-ance, use of legislative history, and Chevron — depend on an initial de-termination of whether a text is clear or ambiguous.
In his article Avoiding Judicial In-Activism: The Use of Legislative History to Determine Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, Matthew B.
Todd notes that researching a legislative history can provide a broad insight into the intent of a statute, as well as a better understanding of its language. He states that since proposed Use of legislative history in statutory interpretation book is drafted and amended, the final language may not adequately delineate the legislators.
legislative history might be consulted to determine Congress’s meanings in cases of apparent absurdity. Since neither scholars nor lawyers dispute that, as a matter of fact, legislative history is used, the question is how it is best used.
More than occasionally, law professors reveal a stunning lack of knowledge about Congress’s rules. Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation.
At oral argument in Carr v. United States,' Justice Alito surprised petitioner's counsel by questioning him on two authorities that neither party had briefed: the Senate Legislative Drafting Manual (Senate Manual)' and the House Legislative Counsel's Manual on Cited by: 2.
A federal judge offers a spirited defense of using legislative history in statutory interpretation. Legislative history is a term that refers to the documents that are produced by Congress as a bill is introduced, studied, and debated.
These legislative documents are often used by attorneys and courts in an attempt to determine Congressional intent or to clarify vague or ambiguous statutory language.
Note, however, that legislative documents are merely persuasive authority, not Author: Anne Guha. Abstract. In this article, use of the notion of legislative intention is defended as a concept appropriate for the context of the exercise of political and legislative agency by Parliament and to protect democratic values, and an account is given of the process of interpretation of legislation by courts and of the location and proper role of the principle of legality within that : Philip Sales.
Grammatical interpretation: using the literal meaning of the statutory text. Historical interpretation: using the legislative history, to reveal the intent of the legislator.
Systematic interpretation: considering the context of provisions, if only by acknowledging in which chapter a provision is listed. It started with Katzmann’s book, Judging Statutes, in which Katzmann argues for greater use of legislative history.
In a Book Review in the Harvard Law Review, Kavanaugh responded by arguing that instead of following Katzmann’s lead, judges should develop some clear 'rules of the road' for statutory interpretation.
Comparative Approaches to the Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation"}" In many legal systems the significance to be attributed to legisla tive history in the context of statutory interpretation remains unsettled.
The following Article explores this matter with regard to German, UK and U.S. law. It develops arguments based on. Using Legislative History in American Statutory Interpretation examines the United States Supreme Court's actual use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, distills the theoretical issues presented by the Court's practices, then analyzes those issues in light of the arguments of several leading theorists.
The book separates the utility and usability of legislative history from theories based on legislative Author: Christian E. Mammen. purposivists and textualists may use any of these tools, a judge’s theory of statutory interpretation may influence the order in which these tools are applied and how much weight is given to each Size: 1MB.
In 'Using Legislative History in American Statutory Interpretation', Dr. Christian Mammen defends the use of legislative history and argues against the traditional link between legislative history and legislative intentions. Legislative history: What principles do courts follow in statutory interpretation.
You’ve done the work. You’ve combed through multiple pieces of legislative history looking for any document that may explain how a problematic and vague statute may impact your case.
This Article examines the relevance of English interpretative practices to the American debate over the use of legislative history in the interpretation of federal statutes.
Part I begins by discussing the English approach to the general problems of statutory interpretation and the use of legislative history. of interpretation in the administrative setting, see Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, MICH.
REV. 89 (). 2 In places, the report also refers to opinions of United States courts of appeals and scholarly discussion of statutory interpretation. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT FRitz SNYDER* Introduction Ever since Justice Antonin Scalia took his place on the Supreme Court inone area of continuing controversy has been the use of legislative history in determining legislative intent.
When statutory language is clear, construction of the statute by reference to its history is unnecessary. This is the "plain meaning rule." Accordingly, when a statute is ambiguous and unclear courts look into the legislative history to clear up the ambiguity.
Courts may use extrinisic aids to help them in their pursuit of the meaning of the Author: Roberta Woods.The Fundamentals of Statutory Interpretation also critiques the various facets of the modern principle with a view to help identify more convincing interpretations of legislative intent.
In addition, it tackles complicated issues concerning both the temporal application of statutes, such as retroactivity and retrospectivity, and when.Description: Contrary to traditional theories of statutory interpretation, which ground statutes in the original legislative text or intent, legal scholar William Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies.
It does so, first of all, because it involves richer authoritative texts than does either common law or constitutional interpretation: statutes are often complex and have a detailed legislative history.